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Abstract 
Why do some individuals pirate digital music while others pay for it? Using data on a 
sample of undergraduate students, we study the determinants of music piracy by looking 
at whether a respondent’s last song was obtained illegally or not. In doing so, we 
incorporate (i) the individual-specific transactions costs that constitute the effective price 
of illegal music; and (ii) individual willingness to pay (WTP) for digital music, which we 
elicit using a simple field experiment and which we use to control for the unobserved 
heterogeneity of preferences between respondents. Our empirical results indicate that a 
respondent’s subjective probability of facing a lawsuit and her degree of morality both 
have a negative impact on the likelihood that her last song was obtained illegally. These 
results are robust whether WTP is estimated parametrically or nonparametrically. We 
conclude by discussing the practical implications of our findings. 
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1. Introduction 
Why do some individuals pirate digital music while others pay for it? With the development and 
proliferation of digital music over the past 15 years, the music industry has gone through a 
profound transformation in the way music is consumed. As a sign that an important milestone 
has been reached, Apple’s iTunes online music store, which was launched in 2001, surpassed 
brick-and-mortar Walmart in early 2008 as the leading music retailer in the United States (NPD 
Group, 2008). 
 
Concomitantly, digital music piracy has emerged as a crime of national scale and concern. A 
report cited on the website of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA) goes so far 
as to claim that music piracy causes global annual losses of about US$12.5 billion (RIAA, 2010). 
In the 2001 A&M Records v. Napster case, the US Court of Appeals ruled that peer-to-peer (P2P) 
networks could be held liable for contributory infringement of record companies’ copyrights 
(Landes and Lichtman, 2003). Yet efforts to stem music piracy have been largely ineffective, as 
evidenced by the RIAA’s announcement in December 2008 that it would put an end to its policy 
of filing lawsuits against individuals suspected of piracy (USA Today, 2008). Consequently, no 
major legal action is currently being pursued to address the widespread problem of music piracy. 
 
Given that college-age individuals are among the most important consumers of music, college 
campuses deserve specific attention. The goal of this paper is thus to identify the determinants of 
music piracy among college students so as to distinguish the policy instruments that can 
effectively help reduce the prevalence of music piracy on college campuses, where it is most 
pervasive. 
 
At its core, this paper studies the demand for illegally obtained digital music among college 
students. But while it is in principle relatively simple to estimate a demand function by 
regressing the quantity demanded of a specific good on its price; on the prices of substitutes and 
complements; and on consumer income, one rapidly encounters significant problems when trying 
to estimate such a demand function for illegal digital music. First are the twin facts that (i) the 
market price of illegal music is zero, so that its effective price is composed entirely of 
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transactions costs;1
 
 and (ii) at the time of the survey, the price of legal music did not vary from 
one source to the other as both iTunes and Amazon – the two leading retailers of digital music – 
had set that price at $0.99. Second, and no less important, is unobserved heterogeneity in 
preferences between consumers, whose presence can lead to mistaken inferences if it is not dealt 
with satisfactorily. 
We address the issue the lack of a market price for illegal music constitutes by measuring the 
transactions costs that are included in the effective price of illegal music. To do so, we first asked 
each respondent about (i) her subjective perception of the likelihood that she will face a lawsuit 
from the RIAA; and (ii) her subjective perception of the litigation costs in case of such a lawsuit. 
We then elicited each respondent’s degree of morality using a proxy measure developed by 
Wood et al. (1988) and used elsewhere in the literature on music piracy (Gopal et al., 2004).2
 
 As 
for the price of legal music, which is everywhere the same, it effectively disappears into the 
constant term of a regression of the demand for illegal music. 
We then address the issue of unobserved heterogeneity in preferences between respondents by 
estimating their willingness to pay (WTP) for digital music on the basis of a simple random 
pricing experiment. Each respondent was asked whether she would be willing to purchase a 
specific song at a price in cents equal to the last two digits of her social security number (SSN).3
 
 
That specific song was the same for everyone (i.e., Flo Rida’s “Right Round”) and was chosen 
because it was the most popular song on iTunes when the survey was launched. Because the last 
two digits of a respondent’s SSN are completely random, the variation in price was exogenous to 
whether a respondent was willing to purchase the song and to whether her last song was obtained 
legally or illegally, which is ultimately what we are interested in. 
                                                 
1 The difference between the market and effective prices of a good is that the former is only the nominal monetary 
price one must pay to acquire the good, whereas the latter is the nominal price plus the various (and often individual-
specific) fixed and variable transactions costs that must be incurred in acquiring the good. In certain contexts, 
transactions costs have been shown to drive the choice to consume specific commodities. In other contexts, 
transactions costs determine whether a market for specific commodities exists at all (de Janvry et al., 1991). 
2 The questions used to elicit this measure can be found in the appendix. 
3 The random price was thus inferior or equal to the $0.99 price charged by either iTunes or Amazon at the time the 
survey was conducted, so that the random pricing experiment did not suffer from an over-representation of “No” 
answers which would have inevitably occurred had the random price exceeded $0.99. 
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Using a well-known method for contingent valuation (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 
1993), we then estimate our respondents’ WTP for digital music. The identifying assumption we 
make in this case is that a respondents’ WTP for the particular song we chose is correlated with 
her “true” WTP for music (i.e., her expected WTP for a randomly selected piece of music in the 
entire universe of pieces of music), and that any discrepancy between a consumer’s estimated 
and her “true” WTP is due purely to noise given the random pricing scheme adopted for the 
contingent valuation question. As such, because estimated WTP is a direct measure of the 
marginal utility a specific consumer derives from digital music, it can be used to control for the 
unobserved preference heterogeneity between consumers, which would otherwise be unobserved 
and would thus bias our coefficient estimates.  
 
Using survey data collected at a Southern private research university, we combine our 
respondents’ WTP for digital music with the various transactions costs they face to estimate the 
determinants of digital music piracy. Ultimately, we find that for a 1 percent increase in the 
average respondent’s subjective probability that she will face a lawsuit as a result of pirating 
digital music, the likelihood that her last song was illegally obtained falls by about 0.4 percent. 
Similarly, for a 10 percent increase in the average respondent’s degree of morality (see the 
appendix for the precise measure we use to elicit our respondents’ morality), the likelihood that 
her last song was illegally obtained falls by about 4 percent. Robustness checks conducted with 
an alternative, nonparametric measure of WTP yield almost identical results. 
 
Most of the previous studies analyzing online piracy have focused on software rather than 
music, although there is a growing literature on digital music piracy. Gopal et al. (2004) develop 
a conceptual model to explain digital music piracy among undergraduates and test it using survey 
data, but their analysis did not include economic variables such as prices or income. d’Astous et 
al. (2005) find that anti-piracy arguments have no effect on the intention to pirate digital music 
of their experimental subjects. Chiou et al. (2005) find that respondents’ subjective perceptions 
of prosecution risk drive behavior in a sample of high school students in Taiwan. Altschuller and 
Benbunan-Fich (2009) find a discrepancy between what their respondents say others should do 
and what their respondents themselves would do when faced with the possibility of pirating 
music. 
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Likewise, Oberholzer-Gee and Strumpf (2007) contradicted the results in Zentner (2004) when 
they found that file sharing has essentially had no effect on music sales, a finding that has been 
contested by Liebowitz (2006). Bhattacharjee et al. (2006) find that even with well-publicized 
lawsuits against the worst offenders, the activity on illegal music sharing networks remains 
considerable, and Gopal et al. (2006) find that allowing consumers to sample at a lower cost 
significantly increases music sales.4
 
 
This paper uses survey data from a sample of college students, as in Rob and Waldfogel 
(2006), who study their respondents’ WTP for music both before and after they have consumed it 
in order to study the impact of music piracy on the sales of legal music and on consumer welfare, 
and as in Shiller and Waldfogel (2009), who ask their respondents what their maximal WTP 
would be for a number of popular songs to compare different pricing schemes. The open-ended 
WTP questions in both Rob and Waldfogel and Shiller and Waldfogel, however, are not 
necessarily incentive compatible given that they are not attached to a second-price auction or a 
Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). The contingent valuation method 
used in this paper was first developed to deal with the incentive compatibility problem (Carson 
and Groves, 2007 and Poe and Vossler, 2009). 
 
Although this paper focuses on students at only one institution of higher education, its 
contribution is to be the first paper to study the demand for illegal music while controlling for 
both (i) the various transactions costs associated with music piracy (i.e., the subjective likelihood 
of getting caught; the expected subjective legal costs; and the respondents’ score on a morality 
proxy); and (ii) the respondents’ WTP for music, elicited here by using a simple field 
experiment. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple theoretical 
model of consumer behavior. In section 3, we present the empirical framework and provide a 
detailed discussion of the identification strategy adopted in this paper. Section 4 presents the data 
                                                 
4 Gopal et al. therefore empirically establish avant la lettre the anecdotal point made by Chris Anderson (2009) in 
his popular-press book. See also Edelman (2009) for a discussion of priced versus unpriced online goods. 
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as well as some descriptive statistics. In section 5, we present and discuss the empirical results. 
Section 6 concludes and offers some policy recommendations on the basis of our empirical 
results. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework 
This section develops a simple conceptual framework aimed at formalizing the reader’s intuition 
regarding why some individuals pay for digital music while others pirate it. The conceptual 
framework developed in this section takes its roots in transactions cost economics (Williamson, 
1989). 
 
Assume a consumer whose income is equal to  consumes three goods: a piece of music that is 
obtained legally ; a piece of music that is obtained illegally ; and a 
composite good of all other commodities in the economy , the respective prices of which 
are , , and . The consumer’s preferences over these three goods can be 
represented by the well-behaved utility function . The consumer’s problem is thus to 
 
          (1) 
 
subject to 
 
,         (2) 
 
where the last equality follows from the fact that the consumer’s utility function is strictly 
increasing. 
 
In what follows, we assume that legal and illegal music are perfect substitutes, i.e., 
, and so a consumer consumes one or the other but not both, i.e., 
. The substitutability assumption stems from the fact that there is essentially no 
difference between a song that is purchased or pirated, as both are in mp3 format. While an mp3 
file does offer a lower audio quality audio than a compact disc (CD), one practically needs to be 
a trained audio engineer to hear and appreciate most of the audio quality of a CD. The audio 
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quality of an mp3 file does depend on its bit rate, for which 128 kbps is the accepted standard, 
i.e., songs purchased from iTunes are encoded at 128 kbps. For compressing a CD into mp3 
format, however, most compression software also uses a baseline bit-rate of 128 kbps. Moreover, 
like all music consumers, music pirates prefer high- to low-quality files, and songs on P2P 
networks are maintained by such individual users. These networks essentially monitor 
themselves because poor quality songs are removed by individual users, thereby ending their 
proliferation across the entire network. Therefore, the quality of both legally- and illegally-
obtained songs should be indistinguishable from one another in equilibrium. 
 
If legal and illegal music are perfect substitutes, it follows that an optimizing consumer can 
either choose legal music, i.e., choose the consumption bundle , or choose illegal 
music, i.e., choose the consumption bundle . The consumer will thus make her choice 
solely on the basis of which consumption bundle allows her to consume more of the composite 
good .  
 
Empirically, however, the market price of illegal music  is everywhere zero, while the 
market price of legal music is $0.99 at leading retailers of digital music. Does this mean that a 
rational consumer should choose to only consume illegal music (and an infinite amount of it at 
that if one extrapolates beyond our model, which only considers one song)? In other words, does 
this mean that anyone who consumes legal music is irrational? No. Instead, the fact that online 
music retailers such as Amazon and iTunes are still in business indicates that our simple model 
should be refined to take into account an important source of heterogeneity between consumers, 
i.e., the individual-specific transactions costs associated with consuming illegal music. 
 
Indeed, the argument we make in this paper is that the consumer incurs potentially important 
transactions costs when consuming illegal music, that these transactions costs are specific to 
individual , and that the price of illegal music  is composed entirely of the individual-specific 
transactions costs , so that . Specifically, a consumer who consumes illegal music 
faces a subjective probability  of getting caught by the authorities and having to pay a fine that 
she subjectively expects to be equal to . As with any illegal activity, music piracy means that 
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individuals are exposed to the risk of legal repercussions. Up until recently, the RIAA had taken 
upon itself the burden of enforcement, pursuing legal action against the individuals it identified 
as music pirates. The lawsuits that the RIAA had filed over the past several years have been the 
primary tool the music industry has employed in addressing the issue of piracy. Rational 
individuals should therefore account for this threat when they decide whether to purchase or 
pirate music. This threat is especially important for college students. Between September 2003 
and February 2007, the RIAA had sued roughly 18,000 individuals, including 1,062 at colleges 
and universities (USA Today, 2007). The likelihood of getting sued for any one individual is in 
principle low, but it is not uncommon for individuals to overweight small-probability events of 
an adverse nature (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), and what affects behavior is the subjective 
perception of that risk. 
     
Additionally, the consumer incurs a hedonic cost of  due to the guilt she may derive from 
consuming illegal music. Indeed, for any issue on which it has legislated, the state essentially 
sends a signal to individuals about what it believes is ethically acceptable. By making it illegal to 
pirate digital music, the state has made it known that music piracy is wrong. This judgment may 
affect how individuals act. But while the state has issued its own judgment on the issue of piracy, 
this by no means serves as the moral standard for each individual. Decisions are based not only 
on what the government tells individuals is ethical, but also on those individuals' internal moral 
opinion on the issue, which obviously need not coincide with that of the law. This ultimately 
affects how individuals behave and whether they will engage in an action, legal or illegal. 
 
Thus, the price of illegal music is such that , where the subscript  
indicates that transactions costs are individual-specific because consumers make consumption 
decisions on the basis of subjective perceptions (Nyarko and Schotter, 2002; Manski, 2004). A 
consumer will thus consume legal music if , and she will choose to consume illegal 
music if . Figures 1 and 2 illustrate these two cases for two consumers  and , where 
, who differ in their subjective assessment of the transactions costs associated with 
consuming illegal music but who are otherwise identical. 
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Individual-specific transactions costs thus create a “price band” around the market price of 
illegal music. If the price of legal music falls within that price band, the consumer chooses to 
consume legal music. Conversely, if the price of legal music falls outside that price band, the 
consumer chooses to consume illegal music. A similar conceptual framework was developed by 
de Janvry et al. (1991) to explain the heterogeneous market participation of households in 
developing countries. 
 
3. Empirical Framework 
We begin this section with a broad discussion of the core equation to be estimated in this paper 
in section 3.1, which is an empirical version of the consumer’s Marshallian demand function 
adapted to the context of this paper.  
 
Because one of the contributions of this paper lies in the way it controls for the unobserved 
heterogeneity in preferences between consumers, we then discuss our identification strategy in 
section 3.2. More specifically, we discuss how we recover WTP for digital music from the 
simple pricing experiment we ran during the survey.  
 
We return to the equation to be estimated in section 3.3, presenting specific versions thereof 
which incorporate WTP as a control for the unobserved heterogeneity between respondent as 
well as measures for the various transactions costs which combine to form the effective price of 
illegal music. 
 
3.1. Estimation Strategy 
Given the data at hand, the behavior we wish to study lends itself to a binary choice model. 
Letting  if the last song downloaded by the respondent was obtained illegally, and  if 
the last song downloaded by the respondent was purchased legally, we are primarily interested in 
estimating a Marshallian demand function, such that 
 
,      (3) 
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where, as in section 2,  is the price of legal music,  is a vector of transactions costs 
associated with digital music piracy, and  is the respondent’s income, but where  is a vector of 
individual characteristics, and  is an error term with mean zero. 
 
The first problem one encounters when wanting to estimate equation 3 is that there is no 
variation in , the price of legal music: at the time of the survey, both iTunes and Amazon – the 
two leading retailers of digital music – had set that price at $0.99. The solution to this problem is 
simple: because the price of legal music is common to all respondents, it can be ignored.  
 
The second, more serious problem one encounters is that there is also no variation in the 
market price of illegal music: it is always zero. One could choose to ignore this problem and 
regress  only on income with some controls for the individual characteristics of the respondent 
thrown in. Assuming one is interested in  or , however, ignoring the lack of variation in the 
(market) price of illegal music would lead to biased estimate of  and  because of two 
fundamental problems. First, the effective price of illegal music is composed entirely of 
transactions costs that add themselves to the market price of zero and which differ from one 
consumer to the other so as to have heterogeneous effects on consumers. If these transactions 
costs are correlated with any of the observable factors included on the right-hand side of 
equation 3, then our coefficient estimates will be biased. Second, consumers derive 
heterogeneous amounts of utility from the consumption of music. Once again, if the utility a 
consumer derives from her consumption of music is correlated with any of the observable factors 
on the right-hand side of equation 3, our coefficient estimates will be biased. 
 
We control for the former problem by directly including (i) the individual-specific transactions 
costs one incurs when acquiring and consuming illegal music; and (ii) a measure of one’s WTP 
for digital music, which is a direct measure of the marginal utility one derives from one’s 
consumption of digital music.   
 
The estimation of our respondents’ WTP for digital music is the subject of the next two 
sections. As regards the transactions costs inherent to digital music piracy, we include each 
respondent’s subjective perception regarding the likelihood she will get caught pirating music 
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and get sued by the RIAA and her subjective perception regarding the total litigation costs if she 
were to get caught. We also elicited each respondent’s degree of morality using a proxy adapted 
from Gopal et al. (2004) and which asks the subjects to rate the ethics of five questions on a scale 
ranging from zero to six. The scores from each question are added to one another to create a 
morality proxy on a 30-point scale. The appendix shows the questions used in constructing the 
morality proxy. 
 
Although the data used in this paper are cross-sectional, one would not necessarily do better in 
terms of identification by using panel data. To deal with unobserved heterogeneity, one must 
typically collect longitudinal data in order to use individual fixed effects to control for all the 
confounding factors that remain constant over time for each individual. But then, there is little to 
no variation in most of the factors considered in this analysis over the few years an individual 
spends in college (e.g., one’s WTP for music; whether one belongs to a fraternity or a sorority; 
one’s major; one’s subjective assessment of the likelihood of getting caught and the 
accompanying legal costs; one’s morality; who pays for one’s tuition; the annual income of one’s 
parents; one’s own annual income; etc.), and those for which there is some variation are of little 
to no interest in studying the decision to pirate digital music (e.g., one’s age, one’s grade point 
average). 
 
3.2. Identification Strategy 
In this section, we discuss the method we use to elicit our respondents WTP for music in detail. 
To do so, we first present a well-known method to parametrically estimate WTP. Because this 
method makes the somewhat restrictive assumption that WTP is normally distributed, we then 
present a method to nonparametrically estimate a lower bound on each respondent’s WTP, which 
will be used in section 5 to check the robustness of our empirical findings. 
 
3.2.1. Willingness to Pay for Music: Parametric Estimation 
In order to elicit our respondents’ WTP for digital music, we ran the following simple field 
experiment. Each respondent was asked to give the last two digits of her SSN and was then asked 
whether she would be willing to buy a specific song for a price in cents equal to the last two 
digits of her SSN. Because we needed a song that would be the same for all respondents and 
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well-known among them, we chose the most downloaded song on iTunes the week the survey 
was launched – Flo Rida’s “Right Round.”  
 
Our argument for why our respondents’ WTP for “Right Round” is a good proxy for their 
WTP for music is as follows. Because the price at which the song was offered is random, the 
variation used to identify WTP is fully exogenous to the dependent variable. In order to obtain a 
respondent’s “true” WTP for music (i.e., her expected WTP for a randomly selected piece of 
legal music in the entire universe of pieces of music), we would need to elicit our respondents’ 
WTP for a random sample of all the pieces of legal music in existence so as to compute, for each 
respondent, an average of her WTP for a piece of music that was obtained legally.  
 
Coming up with such an estimate, however, would prove difficult, if not impossible, given that 
there is no centralized repository of all the digital music that is available legally. If one were to 
go on iTunes or Amazon with the intention of obtaining a random sample of the universe of 
possible songs, it would be very difficult to randomly select a sample of songs from either 
source, given that neither retailer offers a list – in statistical parlance, a sampling frame – from 
which one can readily sample. Instead, potential customers look for music on either retailer’s 
website by entering keywords. 
 
Our respondents’ WTP for a given song, however, should be correlated with their “true” WTP 
(provided enough respondents are familiar with the chosen song, which is why we chose the 
most popular song on iTunes the week the survey was launched), which should itself be 
correlated with their WTP for the last song they obtained. Thus the identifying assumption we 
make is that the cases where a respondent has strong feelings about “Right Round” (and so her 
WTP for this particular song is not representative of her “true” WTP) are randomly distributed 
and are thus purely the result of noise in the data. 
 
In this context, WTP is estimated as follows. Letting  if respondent  stated she would 
buy the song at a price in cents equal to the last two digits of her SSN and  otherwise, we 
estimate the following relationship 
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,         (4) 
 
where  is a vector of controls that also includes a vector of ones,  denotes the last two digits of 
the respondent’s SSN, and  is an error term with mean zero. Following Cameron and James 
(1987) and Vossler and Kerkvliet (2003), we estimate equation 4 as a probit, which allows us to 
recover each respondent ’s WTP, such that 
 
.         (5) 
 
This WTP estimate is then used to control for the unobserved heterogeneity in preferences 
between respondents in equation 3 above.5
 
 
Rob and Waldfogel (2006) and Shiller and Waldfogel (2009) directly ask their respondents 
what their maximum WTP would be for specific songs. It is not clear, however, that such direct 
elicitation is incentive compatible. Generally, open-ended WTP questions are not incentive 
compatible unless they are attached to a second-price auction or a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak 
mechanism (Becker et al., 1964). The contingent valuation method used in this paper was first 
developed to deal with the incentive compatibility problem (see Carson and Groves, 2007 and 
Poe and Vossler, 2009 for discussions). 
 
3.2.2. Willingness to Pay for Music: Nonparametric Estimation 
The WTP estimation method presented in the previous section has the disadvantage that it 
imposes that WTP be normally distributed, which some readers may not be comfortable with. In 
order to relax the normality assumption, this section discusses an estimation method that allows 
recovering a lower bound on each respondent’s WTP but which does not make any distributional 
assumption. The method developed in this section also gives us a convenient way to check the 
robustness of our empirical results with respect to changes in the way WTP is estimated. 
 
                                                 
5 The WTP estimate in equation 3 is not a lower bound on WTP but rather a direct estimate of respondent i’s WTP 
given the formula in equation 3. See Cameron and James (1987) for details. The next section derives a 
nonparametric lower bound estimate of each respondent’s WTP. 
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The nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimation proceeds as follows (Bellemare, 2010). For a 
given random price (i.e., SSN) of , if a respondent says she would buy the song at that price, 
we know that she would be willing to pay at least  for the song. Alternatively, if the respondent 
says she would not buy the song at that price, we know that she would not be willing to pay 
anything for the song. Thus, one can ascribe a value of  as WTP for any respondent who 
answered “Yes” to the contingent valuation question and a value of zero for any respondent who 
answered “No” to the contingent valuation question, which yields a nonparametric lower-bound 
estimate for each respondent’s WTP. 
 
The nonparametric WTP estimate has the advantage of relaxing the normality assumption, but 
it has the disadvantage of assuming that WTP is nonnegative. Generally, this assumption would 
not be innocuous given that WTP for certain goods can be negative (i.e., consumption needs to 
be subsidized for some individual). This is most obvious in those cases where consuming the 
good would have a clear cost. In the case of legal music, however, it is unlikely that any 
respondent would incur a cost if she were merely given a song for free (i.e., if  were equal to 
zero). In other words, it is unlikely that a respondent would require a subsidy in order to be given 
a song for free simply because once the respondent owns the song, nothing forces her to listen to 
it, and the cost of storing one more piece of music is essentially zero. 
 
3.2.3. Reverse Causality and Cognitive Dissonance 
Before returning to our estimation strategy, we must address the issue of whether the individual-
specific subjective transactions costs we treat as our variables of interest could be causally 
affected by whether the respondent’s last song was obtained legally or illegally. Indeed, it is 
entirely plausible that a respondent who has chosen to pirate rather than purchase her last song 
has revised her subjective probability of facing a lawsuit and her subjective expectation of the 
cost she would incur if she were to get caught pirating music, or  that her degree of morality has 
changed as a consequence of her behavior. 
 
When choices affect rather than reflect preferences, social psychologists talk of cognitive 
dissonance, a phenomenon that has been known to economists since the work of Akerlof (1982) 
on the topic. If there were cognitive dissonance in this context, i.e., if the causality ran from 
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whether a respondent’s last song was obtained legally or not to the individual-specific measures 
of transactions costs rather than the other way around, our estimations would suffer from an 
endogeneity problem, and our coefficient estimates would be biased as a result. 
 
We rule out the possibility that cognitive dissonance and reverse causality pose a problem in 
our analysis for the following reasons. First, recent research at the intersection of psychology and 
economics has invalidated almost every study that had previously found evidence in favor of the 
hypothesis that choices affect rather than reflect preferences, i.e., in favor of cognitive 
dissonance (Chen, 2008).   
 
Second, and perhaps more importantly, even if choices did affect rather than reflect preferences 
and the individual-specific subjective transactions costs we include in our analysis were affected 
by our respondents’ habitual behavior, the fact that we include our respondents’ WTP for music 
would take care of this problem.  
 
Indeed, our WTP estimate (which itself does not suffer from cognitive dissonance because it 
was generated from a field experiment) is a direct measure of the marginal utility one derives 
from consuming digital music. If a respondent’s subjective perceptions of the transactions costs 
involved in consuming illegal music increase, the marginal utility the consumer derives from 
consuming music will vary, given that in equilibrium, a consumer’s marginal utility from 
consuming a given good is proportional to the price paid for that good.  
 
In the notation of section 2, one’s marginal utility from consuming digital music is equal to  
 
,   (6) 
 
where  is the Lagrange multiplier attached to the consumer’s budget constraint, which is equal 
to the consumer’s marginal utility of income, and where  is an indicator function equal to one 
if the condition in parentheses is true and equal to zero otherwise. That is, an optimizing 
consumer equates the marginal utility she derives from consuming music (whether legal or 
illegal, since both goods are perfect substitutes) with the product of the marginal utility of her 
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income and the (effective) price she pays for music. Thus, there is a clear positive relationship 
between one’s marginal utility from digital music and . 
 
Thus, by controlling for our respondents’ marginal utility of music by including their 
exogenous WTP for music, we also control for the causal relationship that may potentially run 
from a respondent’s consumption bundle to her subjective transactions costs perceptions by 
exogenizing the variables that make up . In other words, there is no correlation between  
and the error term , and our estimates are not contaminated by the endogeneity problem caused 
by the potential for reverse causality. 
 
3.3. Estimation Strategy (Reprise) 
We start from the simplest, most parsimonious specification of equation 3, progressively 
augmenting it so as to include more and more control variables. The first specification of 
equation 3 that we estimate is such that 
 
,       (7) 
 
where, in a slight abuse of notation,  is the respondent i’s WTP for digital music;  is her 
income (i.e., the income derived from working during the summer and during the school year);  
is a vector of individual characteristics of the respondent; and  is an error term with mean zero. 
 
The specification in equation 3 is a simple Marshallian demand function that fails to control for 
the transactions costs of digital music piracy. Because omitting these transactions costs may lead 
to biased estimates, the second specification of equation 3 we estimate is such that 
 
,      (8) 
 
where  is a vector of the transactions costs involved in digital music piracy (i.e., respondent i’s 
subjective assessment of the likelihood she will get caught and sued by the RIAA for pirating 
music; her subjective assessment of the total litigation costs when getting caught; and her degree 
of morality). 
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Because the average college student typically has a low income, however, and because she 
typically has other sources of income to which she has access (e.g., parental income, grants, 
scholarships, etc.), the last two specifications of equation 3 allow for a wider definition of 
income. Therefore, the third specification of equation 3 we estimate is such that 
 
,      (9) 
 
where  is a vector that includes both the personal income of the student as well as the student’s 
sources of tuition money. Likewise, the fourth specification of equation 3 that we estimate is 
such that 
 
,     (10) 
 
where  is a vector that includes the student’s personal income, her sources of tuition money, 
as well as controls for parental income. 
 
Equations 7 to 10 are estimated by ordinary least squares (OLS) to simplify the interpretation 
of the estimated coefficients and so as to not to have to make any distributional assumption on 
the error term.6
 
 In addition, because the respondents’ WTP to purchase music is a generated 
regressor in the LPM defined by equations 7 to 10, their standard errors are all bootstrapped in 
the empirical results below. Lastly, equations 7 to 10 are each estimated twice for robustness: 
once with the parametric WTP, and once with the nonparametric lower-bound WTP estimate. 
4. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
The data used in this paper were collected using a web-based survey that we developed. On 
March 3, 2009, the survey was sent to the entire undergraduate student body (i.e., over 6,000 
students) of a Southern private research university through the undergraduate email distribution 
                                                 
6 The reader may have noted a discrepancy between our reliance the probit in the previous section and our 
estimating a linear probability model (LPM) in this section. The former is because the WTP estimate we use is 
articulated around the probit in the contingent valuation literature. The latter is so as to obtain coefficients that can 
be directly interpreted as marginal effects. 
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list. Because access to this email list is restricted, and to make sure the respondents understood 
that the data were collected as part of a serious research effort, the survey was sent by the student 
government in one of its weekly emails to the entire undergraduate student body. The specific 
part of the email that linked to our survey read as follows: 
 
“Music piracy and lawsuits against students have been ongoing issues at college campuses 
across the nation. We would like your assistance in addressing this issue by helping us gather 
more information about the nature of music piracy here at [Southern private research 
university]. Click on the link below to take a short (5-minute) online survey about your music 
downloading behavior so we can get more information about why students choose to 
purchase or pirate music. The survey is completely anonymous, and you will have the 
opportunity to enter into a raffle for four Visa gift cards, worth $200, $100, $50, and $50.” 
 
By having the survey sent to every individual within the population, selection bias was 
reduced, and sample size was maximized. University-provided unique identifiers were collected 
so as to be able to give the winners their prize, but respondents were explicitly told that their 
responses were to be kept strictly confidential. 
 
The raw data set comprised 309 observations. Two observations were dropped because the 
same respondent had taken the survey twice; four observations were dropped because they were 
incomplete; and one was dropped because the respondent had clearly not taken the survey 
seriously, e.g., by claiming they were 9 years old, by claiming their expected graduation year 
was 2008, etc. In this paper, an incomplete observation is one for which the respondent stopped 
responding to the survey before she could submit it. Incomplete observations are thus distinct 
from observations for which some data is missing. 
 
4.1 Willingness to Pay for Music 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the sample on which WTP for music is estimated. In 
this case, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent would be 
willing to buy “Right Round” for a price in cents equal to the last two digits of their SSN. 
Almost 40 percent of our respondents would be willing to do so for a price equal to $0.46 on 
average and ranging from $0.00 to $0.98. 
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The average respondent is 20 years old, has a grade point average (GPA) of 3.48 and the modal 
respondent was a junior at the time of the survey given that she expected to graduate in 2010. 
Over a quarter of the respondents took part in Greek life on campus (i.e., they were members of a 
fraternity or a sorority), 17 percent were engineering majors, and 5 percent were undecided.7 
Combining her income from the previous summer with her income from whatever employment 
she may have during the school year, the average respondent had an annual income of $4,300.8,9
 
  
Although estimating a selection equation to account for the difference between respondents 
and nonrespondents is well beyond the scope of the data, we can still assess our survey’s 
comparability with the population from which we sampled.10
 
 In the population, the average GPA 
is equal to 3.44, well within our survey’s 99 percent confidence interval, which is equal to 
[3.437, 3.534]. Likewise, in the population, the proportion of engineering majors is 18.9 percent, 
and in our survey, the 99 percent confidence interval is equal to [0.11, 0.23]. Similarly, in the 
population, the proportion of students who are in a fraternity or a sorority is 34 percent, and in 
our survey, the 99 percent confidence interval is equal to [0.21, 0.34]. Therefore, the degree of 
comparability between our survey and the population from which we sampled is within the 
conventional levels. 
Because a respondent’s own annual income is a strict definition of income – many students do 
not work during the school year and only take on unpaid internships during the summer – we 
include two more variables to account for a respondent’s full income constraint: the income of 
her parents, and how her tuition is paid for. The parents of the respondent made less than 
$50,000 per year in 14.8 percent of cases; between $50,000 and $100,000 in 24.4 percent of 
                                                 
7 While the breakdown of students between engineering and other majors may strike the reader as odd, 
undergraduates are seen as belonging to one of two colleges (i.e., engineering or arts and sciences) at the university 
level. 
8 A better measure of a student’s ability to pay might be her total consumption expenditures for the week or month 
before the survey, but the survey did not collect information on consumption expenditures. 
9 Although we collected data on the gender of each respondent, that variable was dropped by the application we used 
to run the survey, and was deemed irrecoverable by the administrators of the university network through which the 
survey was run. 
10 The population proportions for whether one is in a fraternity or in a sorority and whether one is an engineering 
major were found on the university’s website. The average GPA in the population was found in an article published 
in the university’s student-run independent daily newspaper. 
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cases; between $100,000 and $150,000 in 21.3 percent of cases; between $150,000 and $200,000 
in 10 percent of cases; between $200,000 and $250,000 in 8.6 percent of cases; and $250,000 or 
more in 21 percent of cases. Unsurprisingly, the bimodal nature of the distribution of parental 
income – a peak in the $50,000 and $100,000 category and another in the more than $250,000 
category – is seemingly reflected in how students pay for tuition: in almost 85 percent of cases, 
the respondent’s parents partially pay the respondent’s tuition, but over 40 percent of 
respondents have a scholarship, and over 30 percent of them have a grant. 
 
We also include the perceived popularity of the last song downloaded either legally or illegally 
by the respondent so as to crudely control for the respondent’s tastes when studying her 
willingness to purchase “Right Round,” under the assumption that the respondent’s last song is 
representative of her tastes, and that departures from this representativeness are purely due to 
noise. The last song downloaded was also distributed bimodally, as it was deemed “unique” (and 
therefore very unpopular) by 15.1 percent of respondents; unpopular by 22 percent of 
respondents; somewhat popular by 16.5 percent of respondents; popular by 17.9 percent of 
respondents; and very popular by 28.5 percent of respondents. Finally, given the timing of the 
survey, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has received an iTunes gift 
card – a source of “income” that can only be used for the specific purpose of purchasing legal 
music – for Christmas and equal to zero otherwise. Omitting this variable could bias our estimate 
of WTP for music, given that almost 35 percent of respondents have received such a gift card. 
 
4.2 Music Piracy 
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the sub-sample used to study the determinants of digital 
music piracy.11
                                                 
11 The sample size in this case (n=262) was smaller than in the previous case (n=291), both because there were a 
number of observations for which the value of some variable was missing and because we threw way four 
observations for which the expected cost of a lawsuit were entered frivolously (i.e., values in the billions of dollars; 
a value of $1,111,111). 
 In this case, the dependent variable is a dummy variable equal to one if the last 
song downloaded by the respondent was obtained illegally and equal to zero if was obtained 
legally. Once again, the assumption we make is that this last song is representative of the average 
behavior of each respondent, and that cases where the respondent’s last song is not representative 
of her habitual behavior are purely due to noise.  
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A little over 30 percent of our respondents reported that their last song had been obtained 
illegally, a finding that is consistent with the average WTP for music – which was equal to $0.69 
in our sample with a nonparametric lower bound of $0.13 – being well below the $0.99 market 
price of music. Figure 3, which shows the distribution of WTP for music in our sample, indicates 
that the vast majority of respondents have a WTP that is below $0.99. 
 
The variables carried over from the estimation of our respondents’ WTP for music (i.e., 
individual characteristics; sources of tuition money; annual income of parents; whether the 
respondent received an iTunes gift card for Christmas) do not differ substantially between the 
sample used to study WTP and the sub-sample retained to study the determinants of digital 
music piracy. Three new variables, however, are included as transactions costs in the equation 
used to study digital music piracy, viz. the respondent’s subjective assessment of the likelihood 
that she will face a lawsuit in case of music piracy; her expected settlement cost in case there is 
such a lawsuit; and the value of the respondent’s morality proxy. 
 
The average subjective probability of a lawsuit, at almost 9 percent, is a prima facie high. In 
this case, however, the mean is particularly sensitive to outliers. Indeed, almost 75 percent of 
responses report subjective perceptions of 5 percent or below. The seven respondents whose 
subjective perceptions were of 75 percent or above drive the mean upward, and the median 
subjective perception is 1 percent. Regarding the expected cost of a lawsuit, the distribution 
follows a pattern similar to that of the respondent’s subjective probability of a lawsuit since the 
mean expected cost is $8,600. In truth, the average cost in case of an RIAA lawsuit is $3,000 
(USA Today, 2007). This distortion could be due to a genuine lack of information on the part of 
our respondents, or it could be due to the way the question was asked, which did not differentiate 
between lawsuit settlement costs and total legal costs, of which lawsuit settlement costs are only 
a fraction. About 75 percent of respondents responded with values of $3,000 or less (in fact, 36 
respondents out of 262, or 14 percent responded exactly $3,000, reflecting scant knowledge of 
the RIAA’s practices among our respondents), and the median value was $1,000. The presence 
of outliers thus drives the mean upwards. 
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Finally, as regards our morality proxy, figure 4 shows the distribution of morality within our 
sample and shows that it is roughly normal. Cronbach’s , a measure commonly used by 
psychometricians to assess the internal consistency and reliability of a survey question such as 
this one (Cronbach, 1951), was equal to 0.74, which indicates that our morality proxy is 
consistent and reliable, as it is above the 0.7 threshold for a reliable instrument. Given that the 
average respondent has a morality of 24.3 and that the modal morality is equal to 25, both the 
mean and modal respondents lie relatively high on the morality scale. There is considerable 
variation in the morality of our respondents, however, given that the standard deviation for the 
morality proxy was equal to 4.6. After estimating the WTP for music in our sample, the next 
section investigates whether these transactions costs affects the decision to pirate digital music, 
ceteris paribus. 
 
5. Estimation Results 
We now turn to the empirical analysis, which first consists in estimating the WTP for digital 
music using a method for contingent valuation (Mitchell and Carson, 1989; Arrow et al., 1993) 
that is well known in environmental economics (Cameron and James, 1987; Vossler and 
Kerkvliet, 2003), and then consists in estimating the determinants of the decision to pirate digital 
music. 
 
5.1. Willingness to Pay 
Table 3 reports the marginal effect of each explanatory variable on whether respondents’ are 
willing to purchase Flo Rida’s “Right Round.” These marginal effects are derived from the 
estimated coefficients in equation 4. Evidently, the most important finding in this case is that the 
random price (i.e., the last two digits of a respondent’s SSN in cents) has the expected effect, and 
that this is statistically significant: for a $0.01 increase in the price the average respondent faces, 
the probability that the respondent will be willing to buy the song is decreased by 0.6 percent. 
Income also matters in that for every additional $10,000 of own income, the probability that the 
respondent will be willing to buy the song falls by 16 percent, indicating that “Right Round” is 
an inferior good when considering only one’s own income. When controlling for the annual 
income of the parents, respondents whose parents are in all income categories are less likely to 
wish to purchase the song than respondents whose parents are in the more than $250,000 
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category (i.e., the omitted category), but this is only significant in the less than $50,000 and the 
$150,000 to $200,000 categories. Unsurprisingly, a student who has received an iTunes gift card 
was 26 percent more likely to be willing to download the song. 
 
Respondents who are members of the Greek system, i.e., fraternities and sororities, are 16 
percent more likely to be willing to buy “Right Round.” A student who rated the last song she 
had downloaded as very unpopular was 22 percent less likely to be willing to purchase “Right 
Round,” which indicates that taste matters in this setting. Finally, respondents on scholarships 
were 13 percent less likely to be willing to download the song. 
 
5.2. Music Piracy 
The estimation results in table 3 are then used to estimate respondents’ WTP for music, which 
was shown in figure 3 and which we use as a measure related to the price of substitutes in the 
demand for pirated digital music. Table 4 presents estimation results for equations 7 to 10. As 
regards the variables of interest (i.e., price and income), digital music piracy decreases as WTP 
for music increases to the tune of a 1 percent decrease for every $0.04 increase in WTP in 
columns 1 to 3. This effect is present only insofar as one fails to control for the annual income of 
the respondent’s parents: in column 4, the respondent’s WTP no longer has a significant impact 
on the decision to pirate music. One’s own income has no impact on the decision to pirate music, 
but respondents whose parents are poorer are more likely to pirate digital music, a relationship 
that is roughly monotonic along income categories, save for a peak in the $100,000 to $150,000 
category. Likewise, a student who has received an iTunes gift card for Christmas is 15 percent 
less likely to pirate music in column 4. 
 
If price only matters as long as one fails to control for full income, what are the factors that 
actually drive digital music piracy? As it turns out, individual-specific subjective perceptions of 
transactions costs have a significant negative impact at the margin: for a 1 percent increase in the 
subjective probability of getting sued for obtaining music illegally, the likelihood that a 
respondent will pirate music falls by about 0.4 percent in columns 2 to 4. This is similar to Chiou 
et al.’s (2005) findings for Taiwanese high school students. Likewise, for a 10 percent (i.e., 2.4-
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point) increase in the average respondent’s morality score, the likelihood that she will choose to 
pirate digital music falls by over 4 percent. 
 
Because the results in table 4 rely on the assumption that our respondents’ WTP for digital 
music is normally distributed (i.e., the WTP estimate discussed in section 3.2.1), we re-estimate 
equations 7 to 10 in table 5 using a nonparametric lower bound on our respondents’ WTP (i.e., 
the estimate discussed in section 3.2.2) in table 5. These last results show that our estimation 
results are robust to changes in the method used to estimate WTP. 
 
The empirical results in tables 4 and 5 thus offer strong support for the hypothesis that 
transactions costs exert an important influence on the decision to pirate digital music. When 
considering the decision to pirate digital music in our sample, WTP for music only matters 
insofar as one assumes that parental income is constant across respondents, but the subjective 
probability of getting caught and of subsequently facing a lawsuit by the RIAA and the 
respondents’ sense of morality always matter. Finally, while it may seem a priori surprising that 
a respondent’s subjective assessment of the litigation cost she would bear in case of a RIAA 
lawsuit has no impact on the decision to pirate music, this is due to the fact that very few of our 
respondents knew the actual cost of a lawsuit, as witnessed by the large standard errors around 
the mean of this variable in table 2. 
 
6. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
We have studied the determinants of digital music piracy using survey data collected from 
undergraduates at a Southern private research university. To do so, we first asked respondents 
whether they would be willing to buy a specific song for a price in cents equal to the last two 
digits of their SSN.  
 
Doing so allowed us to treat that price as completely exogenous to whether respondents are 
willing to buy the song as well as to estimate each respondent’s WTP for music. We then asked 
each respondent whether the last song they had downloaded was obtained legally or illegally. We 
then estimated the determinants of digital music piracy by regressing their answer to that 
question on their WTP for music and on the transactions costs incurred when pirating digital 
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music, i.e., each respondent’s subjective assessment of the probability she will get caught 
pirating music; her expected legal settlement costs if she gets caught; and a proxy for the 
respondent’s morality. 
 
Our empirical results show that WTP for music only has a significant negative effect on music 
piracy insofar as controls for parental income are omitted. In other words, one’s WTP for music 
is driven largely by one’s full income, which includes parental income for the college students 
considered in this paper. More importantly, we find that transactions costs significantly affect the 
decision to pirate music. For a 1 percent increase in a respondent’s subjective assessment of the 
likelihood that she will get caught pirating music, the likelihood that her last song was pirated 
decreases by almost 0.5 percent. For a 10 percent increase in a respondent’s morality proxy, the 
likelihood that her last song was pirated decreases by 0.2 percent. Finally, respondents who had 
recently received an iTunes gift card were 15 percent less likely to have pirated their last song, 
and the lower the annual income of a respondent’s parents, the more likely she was to have 
pirated her last song. 
 
These findings point to an important policy recommendation. If the goal of the RIAA was 
solely to deter piracy, it should not have abandoned its policy of suing the people it caught 
pirating digital music. Indeed, after suing 30,000 people over five years, the RIAA announced on 
December 19, 2008 that it would stop suing people over digital music piracy. Our findings 
nevertheless indicate that the threat of legal action had a significant impact at the margin on our 
respondent’s decision to pirate music. 
 
Moreover, given that our sample is composed of college students, a university that wants to 
reduce music piracy could use our estimate of WTP for music to sign a licensing agreement with 
an online music retailer wherein students can download music at a subsidized price below mean 
estimated WTP. For example, suppose that the university we sampled from wanted to completely 
eliminate music piracy based on our results. It could do so by signing a licensing agreement with 
an online music retailer that allows students to buy songs for $0.10 a piece, given that the lower 
bound of our parametric WTP estimate was $0.11. Such a policy would evidently be costly, so it 
may be more reasonable to argue for a reduction in music piracy, which our WTP estimate also 
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allows one to compute. For example, ignoring the transactions costs of music piracy and 
assuming that people only pirate music when their WTP falls below $0.99, a quick back-of-the-
envelope calculation indicate that pricing each song at $0.81 would allow decreasing music 
piracy by 25 percent, and that pricing each song at $0.63 would allow decreasing music piracy 
by 50 percent. Recall that iTunes has announced a new, three-tiered pricing structure wherein 
some songs retail for $0.69, some for $0.99, and some for $1.29 in early April 2009. While the 
lower tier of that new pricing structure will almost surely contribute to eliminating music piracy, 
the upper tier, which is usually reserved for popular new releases, is slightly below the upper 
bound of our WTP estimate and, as such, may be set a bit too high. 
 
Cornell University adopted such a policy between 2004 and 2006, when an anonymous donor 
paid for two years worth of Napster service for the university community. According to the web 
site of Cornell’s Center for Information Technology, however, “[t]he continuation of the 
program into the 2006-07 academic year and beyond depended on the inclusion of a part or all of 
future expenses in the Student Activity Fee. During the fall 2005 Student Activity Fee 
deliberations, the Student Assembly chose not to pick up the issue. Therefore, Cornell’s contract 
with Napster was allowed to expire.”12
 
 It seems the student government chose not to renew the 
agreement with Napster because the agreement was seen as “anti-Apple,” both because Napster 
did not support the Mac operating system and because the music purchased on Napster could not 
be played on the Apple iPod. 
Finally, an important caveat applies to our findings in that our sample includes only college 
students, and that these students were all surveyed from a single university. Researchers 
interested in music piracy should aim to both compare between various institutions of higher 
learning as well as to expand the scope of analysis to the population at large. 
 
  
                                                 
12 See http://www2.cit.cornell.edu/services/music/napster/faq.shtml.  
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Appendix 
The morality proxy we use as one of our transactions costs for digital music piracy was 
originally developed by Wood et al. (1988) and is adapted from Gopal et al. (2004). To eliminate 
potential framing effects, each respondent was asked to answer the following five questions at 
the very beginning of the survey (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981) by giving an answer ranging 
from 0 (for “Never acceptable”) to 6 (for “Always acceptable”) for each question: 
 
1. An executive earning $50,000 a year padded his expense account by about $1,500 a year. 
2. In order to increase profits, a general manager used a production process which exceeded 
legal limits for environmental pollution. 
3. Because of pressure from his brokerage firm, a stockbroker recommended a type of bond 
which he did not consider a good investment. 
4. A small business received one-fourth of its gross revenue in the form of cash. The owner 
reported only half of the cash receipts for income tax purposes. 
5. An engineer discovered what he perceived to be a product design flaw, which constituted a 
safety hazard. His company declined to correct the flaw. The engineer decided to keep quiet, 
rather than taking his complaint outside the company. 
 
Each respondent’s morality proxy can then be computed by summing over the answers given to 
these five questions and by subtracting the amount from 30. Indeed, because the six-point scale 
of the answer is increasing in the respondent’s amount of immorality; we simply invert the proxy 
so as to use a morality proxy in our empirical work. 
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Figure 1. The market for digital music for a consumer whose individual-specific transactions costs of consuming illegal music drive the effective price of 
illegal music above the market price of legal music. 
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Figure 2. The market for digital music for a consumer whose individual-specific transactions costs of consuming illegal music drive the effective price of 
illegal music below the market price of legal music.
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Figure 3. Histogram and Kernel Density Estimate of the WTP for Digital Music with Epanechnikov 
Kernel and $0.10 Bandwidth.  
 
Figure 4. Kernel Density Estimate of the Morality Proxy with Epanechnikov Kernel and Three-Point 
Bandwidth. 
0
.5
1
1.
5
D
en
si
ty
0 .5 1 1.5
Willingness to Pay (Dollars)
Discrete
Continuous
Distribution of Willingness to Pay
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
D
en
si
ty
0 10 20 30 40
Morality Proxy
Kernel Density Estimate
Normal Density
34 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics for Willingness to Pay for Digital Music (n=291) 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Would Buy "Right Round" at Random Price Dummy 0.361 (0.481) 
Random Price (Dollars) 0.461 (0.303) 
Individual Characteristics 
  Age (Years) 19.849 (1.376) 
Grade Point Average (Four-Point Scale) 3.480 (0.316) 
Greek Dummy 0.271 (0.445) 
Expected Graduation Year 2010.553 (1.092) 
Engineering Major Dummy 0.168 (0.375) 
Undecided Major Dummy 0.048 (0.214) 
Annual Income ($10,000) 0.432 (0.620) 
Popularity of Last Song 
  Very Unpopular Dummy 0.151 (0.359) 
Unpopular Dummy 0.220 (0.415) 
Somewhat Popular Dummy 0.165 (0.372) 
Popular Dummy 0.179 (0.384) 
Very Popular Dummy 0.285 (0.452) 
Sources of Tuition Money 
  Parents Dummy 0.835 (0.372) 
Family Dummy 0.041 (0.199) 
Savings Dummy 0.203 (0.403) 
Loans Dummy 0.371 (0.484) 
Grants Dummy 0.302 (0.460) 
Scholarships Dummy 0.409 (0.492) 
Other Sources Dummy 0.103 (0.305) 
Annual Income of Parents   
 Less than $50,000 Dummy 0.148 (0.355) 
Between $50,000 and $100,000 Dummy 0.244 (0.430) 
Between $100,000 and $150,000 Dummy 0.213 (0.410) 
Between $150,000 and $200,000 Dummy 0.100 (0.300) 
Between $200,000 and $250,000 Dummy 0.086 (0.281) 
More than $250,000 Dummy 0.210 (0.408) 
Received an iTunes Gift Card for Christmas Dummy 0.347 (0.477) 
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Table 2. Descriptive Statistics for the Decision to Pirate Music (n=262) 
Variable Mean (Std. Dev.) 
Last Song Illegally Obtained Dummy 0.302 (0.460) 
Parametric Willingness to Pay (Dollars) 0.691 (0.254) 
Nonparametric Lower Bound on Willingness to Pay (Dollars) 0.131 (0.240) 
Annual Income ($10,000) 0.450 (0.646) 
Individual Characteristics 
  Age (Completed Years) 19.809 (1.232) 
Grade-Point Average (Four-Point Scale) 3.476 (0.317) 
Greek Dummy 0.286 (0.453) 
Expected Graduation Year 2010.546 (1.088) 
Engineering Major Dummy 0.164 (0.371) 
Undecided Major Dummy 0.046 (0.209) 
Transactions costs 
  Subjective Probability of Lawsuit 0.077 (0.169) 
Subjective Cost of Lawsuit ($1,000) 8.602 (69.081) 
Morality Proxy (Thirty-Point Scale) 24.412 (4.690) 
Sources of Tuition Money 
  Parents Dummy 0.844 (0.364) 
Family Dummy 0.046 (0.209) 
Savings Dummy 0.206 (0.405) 
Loans Dummy 0.385 (0.488) 
Grants Dummy 0.294 (0.456) 
Scholarships Dummy 0.405 (0.492) 
Other Sources Dummy 0.103 (0.305) 
Annual Income of Parents 
  Less than $50,000 Dummy 0.134 (0.341) 
Between $50,000 and $100,000 Dummy 0.256 (0.437) 
Between $100,000 and $150,000 Dummy 0.214 (0.411) 
Between $150,000 and $200,000 Dummy 0.095 (0.294) 
Between $200,000 and $250,000 Dummy 0.088 (0.284) 
More than $250,000 Dummy 0.214 (0.411) 
Received an iTunes Gift Card for Christmas Dummy 0.370 (0.484) 
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Table 3. Probit Estimation Results for Willingness to Pay for Digital Music 
Variable Marginal Effect   (Std. Err.) 
(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Willing to Purchase "Right Round"; = 0 Otherwise.) 
Random Price -0.578 *** (0.107) 
Age -0.002 
 
(0.047) 
GPA -0.007 
 
(0.098) 
Greek 0.163 ** (0.076) 
Expected Graduation Year 0.010 
 
(0.055) 
Engineering Major 0.059 
 
(0.086) 
Undecided Major 0.146 
 
(0.172) 
Income  -0.157 ** (0.063) 
Last Song Very Unpopular -0.228 ** (0.073) 
Last Song Unpopular -0.084 
 
(0.080) 
Last Song Somewhat Popular -0.123 
 
(0.082) 
Last Song Popular -0.035 
 
(0.088) 
Tuition: Family -0.086 
 
(0.134) 
Tuition: Savings -0.063 
 
(0.082) 
Tuition: Loans 0.081 
 
(0.082) 
Tuition: Grants -0.033 
 
(0.093) 
Tuition: Scholarships -0.128 * (0.073) 
Tuition: Other -0.133 
 
(0.093) 
Parents: Less than $50,000 -0.197 * (0.092) 
Parents: Between $50,000 and $100,000 -0.157 
 
(0.093) 
Parents: Between $100,000 and $150,000 -0.113 
 
(0.088) 
Parents: Between $150,000 and $200,000 -0.202 * (0.081) 
Parents: Between $200,000 and $250,000 -0.053 
 
(0.113) 
Received an iTunes Gift Card 0.257 *** (0.071) 
Number of Observations 291 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.00 
Pseudo R2 0.25 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Variables of 
interest are highlighted. 
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Table 4. LPM Estimation Results for the Decision to Pirate Music Conditional on Parametric WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Last Song was Obtained Illegally; = 0 Otherwise.) 
Willingness to Pay -0.204 * (0.116) -0.253 ** (0.113) 
Income 0.014 
 
(0.053) -0.007 
 
(0.051) 
Age 0.046 
 
(0.048) 0.054 
 
(0.047) 
GPA -0.070 
 
(0.085) -0.083 
 
(0.087) 
Greek -0.030 
 
(0.068) -0.024 
 
(0.068) 
Expected Graduation Year 0.017 
 
(0.055) 0.027 
 
(0.053) 
Engineering Major 0.109 
 
(0.082) 0.105 
 
(0.081) 
Undecided Major 0.008 
 
(0.126) 0.036 
 
(0.127) 
Subjective Probability of Lawsuit 
   
-0.434 *** (0.118) 
Subjective Cost of Lawsuit 
   
0.001 
 
(0.002) 
Morality 
   
-0.018 *** (0.006) 
Tuition: Other Relative 
      Tuition: Savings 
      Tuition: Loans 
      Tuition: Grants 
      Tuition: Scholarships 
      Tuition: Other 
      Parents: Less than $50,000 
      Parents: $50,000 to $100,000 
      Parents: $100,000 to $150,000 
      Parents: $150,000 to $200,000 
      Parents: $200,000 to $250,000 
      Received an iTunes Gift Card 
      Intercept -34.447   (112.021) -54.548   (106.776) 
Number of Observations 262 262 
Bootstrap Replications 500 500 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.26 0.00 
R2 0.04 0.10 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped throughout. Variables of interest are highlighted. 
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Table 4. LPM Estimation Results for the Decision to Pirate Music Conditional on Parametric WTP (Continued.) 
  (3) (4) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Last Song was Obtained Illegally; = 0 Otherwise) 
Willingness to Pay -0.265 ** (0.130) -0.089 
 
(0.135) 
Income -0.005 
 
(0.052) 0.014 
 
(0.050) 
Age 0.055 
 
(0.047) 0.055 
 
(0.043) 
GPA -0.091 
 
(0.089) -0.118 
 
(0.090) 
Greek -0.028 
 
(0.069) -0.033 
 
(0.067) 
Expected Graduation Year 0.029 
 
(0.054) 0.043 
 
(0.051) 
Engineering Major 0.107 
 
(0.083) 0.094 
 
(0.083) 
Undecided Major 0.021 
 
(0.138) -0.008 
 
(0.145) 
Subjective Probability of Lawsuit -0.433 *** (0.128) -0.481 *** (0.127) 
Subjective Cost of Lawsuit 0.001 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.003) 
Morality -0.018 *** (0.006) -0.017 *** (0.006) 
Tuition: Other Relative 0.050 
 
(0.147) 0.047 
 
(0.139) 
Tuition: Savings 0.016 
 
(0.082) 0.005 
 
(0.085) 
Tuition: Loans -0.002 
 
(0.069) -0.040 
 
(0.070) 
Tuition: Grants -0.081 
 
(0.088) -0.142 
 
(0.092) 
Tuition: Scholarships 0.036 
 
(0.070) -0.001 
 
(0.070) 
Tuition: Other 0.031 
 
(0.110) 0.054 
 
(0.111) 
Parents: Less than $50,000 
   
0.339 *** (0.106) 
Parents: $50,000 to $100,000 
   
0.216 ** (0.090) 
Parents: $100,000 to $150,000 
   
0.244 *** (0.085) 
Parents: $150,000 to $200,000 
   
0.204 * (0.116) 
Parents: $200,000 to $250,000 
   
0.079 
 
(0.101) 
Received an iTunes Gift Card 
   
-0.148 ** (0.060) 
Intercept -58.086   (108.916) -85.742   (102.730) 
Number of Observations 262 262 
Bootstrap Replications 500 500 
p-value (All Coefficients) 0.01 0.00 
R2 0.11 0.18 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped throughout. Variables of interest are highlighted. 
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Table 5. LPM Estimation Results for the Decision to Pirate Music Conditional on Nonparametric Lower Bound WTP 
  (1) (2) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Last Song was Obtained Illegally; = 0 Otherwise) 
Nonparametric WTP -0.246 ** (0.116) -0.211 * (0.116) 
Income 0.012 
 
(0.051) -0.005 
 
(0.050) 
Age 0.046 
 
(0.046) 0.054 
 
(0.045) 
GPA -0.071 
 
(0.084) -0.079 
 
(0.084) 
Greek -0.035 
 
(0.070) -0.040 
 
(0.069) 
Expected Graduation Year 0.018 
 
(0.053) 0.026 
 
(0.051) 
Engineering Major 0.117 
 
(0.082) 0.115 
 
(0.082) 
Undecided Major 0.016 
 
(0.125) 0.040 
 
(0.128) 
Subjective Probability of Lawsuit 
   
-0.386 *** (0.120) 
Subjective Cost of Lawsuit 
   
0.001 
 
(0.002) 
Morality 
   
-0.016 *** (0.006) 
Tuition: Other Relative 
      Tuition: Savings 
      Tuition: Loans 
      Tuition: Grants 
      Tuition: Scholarships 
      Tuition: Other 
      Parents: Less than $50,000 
      Parents: $50,000 to $100,000 
      Parents: $100,000 to $150,000 
      Parents: $150,000 to $200,000 
      Parents: $200,000 to $250,000 
      Received an iTunes Gift Card 
      Intercept -35.822   (108.085) -52.315   (103.178) 
Number of Observations 262 262 
Bootstrap Replications 500 500 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.07 0.00 
R-square 0.04 0.10 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped throughout. Variables of interest are highlighted. 
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Table 5. LPM Estimation Results for the Decision to Pirate Music Conditional on Nonparametric Lower Bound WTP 
(Continued.) 
  (3) (4) 
Variable Coefficient   (Std. Err.) Coefficient   (Std. Err.) 
(Dependent Variable: = 1 if Last Song was Obtained Illegally; = 0 Otherwise) 
Nonparametric WTP -0.202 * (0.119) -0.082 
 
(0.122) 
Income -0.003 
 
(0.051) 0.014 
 
(0.050) 
Age 0.054 
 
(0.046) 0.054 
 
(0.043) 
GPA -0.080 
 
(0.087) -0.115 
 
(0.087) 
Greek -0.042 
 
(0.070) -0.037 
 
(0.068) 
Expected Graduation Year 0.027 
 
(0.052) 0.042 
 
(0.050) 
Engineering Major 0.116 
 
(0.084) 0.097 
 
(0.083) 
Undecided Major 0.027 
 
(0.139) -0.007 
 
(0.146) 
Subjective Probability of Lawsuit -0.387 *** (0.131) -0.468 *** (0.129) 
Subjective Cost of Lawsuit 0.001 
 
(0.002) 0.001 
 
(0.003) 
Morality -0.016 *** (0.006) -0.016 *** (0.006) 
Tuition: Other Relative 0.062 
 
(0.145) 0.052 
 
(0.138) 
Tuition: Savings 0.018 
 
(0.083) 0.006 
 
(0.085) 
Tuition: Loans 0.003 
 
(0.069) -0.038 
 
(0.070) 
Tuition: Grants -0.061 
 
(0.084) -0.136 
 
(0.089) 
Tuition: Scholarships 0.045 
 
(0.072) 0.000 
 
(0.071) 
Tuition: Other 0.061 
 
(0.109) 0.064 
 
(0.107) 
Parents: Less than $50,000 
   
0.349 *** (0.107) 
Parents: $50,000 to $100,000 
   
0.216 ** (0.093) 
Parents: $100,000 to $150,000 
   
0.247 *** (0.086) 
Parents: $150,000 to $200,000 
   
0.213 * (0.120) 
Parents: $200,000 to $250,000 
   
0.087 
 
(0.102) 
Received an iTunes Gift Card 
   
-0.149 ** (0.061) 
Intercept -54.013   (105.635) -84.102   (101.839) 
Number of Observations 262 262 
Bootstrap Replications 500 500 
p-value (Joint Significance) 0.01 0.00 
R-square 0.10 0.18 
Note: The symbols ***, **, and * respectively denote statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels. Standard errors are 
bootstrapped throughout.  
 
 
